redit card debt is widespread. US households with at least one credit card report carrying, on average, $3,027 in revolving debt (based on the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances). There is, however, signi cant heterogeneity in credit card borrowing. Only 45 percent of card holders report that they, at least sometimes, carry balances on their credit cards. Among these individuals, average credit card debt is $5,799. These gures illustrate two important stylized facts of credit card debt. First, the level of card borrowing is substantial (and likely much higher than these selfreported gures suggest, as discussed later in this paper). Second, some individuals charge to their credit cards signi cantly, while others accumulate no debt at all. This paper tests whether heterogeneity in individual time preferences correlates with credit card borrowing. In a large eld study, we measure individual time preferences using incentivized choice experiments and link resulting impatience measures to administrative data on borrowing. In particular, we investigate whether individuals who exhibit present-biased preferences, that is, those who show a particular desire for immediate consumption, have higher credit card balances.
This study overcomes the limitations of both previous approaches by combining directly elicited time preference measures with administrative data on borrowing. This approach provides direct evidence on the link between present bias and credit card borrowing using objective, administrative data that eliminates the confounding factor of truthfulness in self-reported debt levels. For a sample of about 600 low-to moderate-income (LMI) individuals, we measure time preferences using incentivized choice experiments. The choice experiments allow us to measure individual discount factors, and to identify individuals who exhibit dynamically inconsistent time preferences (e.g., present bias). Resulting parameter estimates are linked to individual credit reports and tax returns. Credit reports give objective information on card borrowing and credit constraints; and tax returns provide objective information on individual incomes.
Our results show that experimentally measured present bias correlates highly with credit card borrowing. Individuals who exhibit present-biased preferences have substantially higher revolving credit balances. In our sample, present-biased individuals are about 15 percentage points more likely than dynamically consistent individuals to have any credit card debt. Conditional on borrowing, present-biased individuals borrow about 25 percent more than dynamically consistent individuals. The association between present bias and credit card borrowing holds when controlling for income, credit constraints (both credit access and credit limits), and socio-demographic characteristics. These results are the rst direct support for behavioral economics models claiming that credit card debt is related to present-biased preferences.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the design of the eld study, our methodology for eliciting time preferences, and the data. Section II presents results, and Section III concludes.
I. Data

A. Field Study Design
The eld study was conducted with 606 individuals at two Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) sites in Boston, MA.
5 During the 2006 tax season, the study was conducted in the Dorchester neighborhood (N = 139). During the 2007 tax season, the study was conducted in the Roxbury neighborhood (N = 467). The two years differ mainly in the way in which time preferences were elicited (discussed in detail later in this paper).
We obtained consent from all participants to access their credit reports and to retrieve income information from their tax returns. Additionally, we surveyed participants to obtain certain socio-demographic characteristics (most likely measured with more error than information from tax data), and elicited their time preferences using incentivized choice experiments. We obtain a usable measure of time preferences for 541 of the 606 individuals who participated (see Section IC for details). These individuals represent our primary study sample.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the socio-demographic characteristics of all participants (column 1), and for those in our primary sample (column 2). The average participant has low disposable income of around $18,000, is African American, female, about 36 years old, with some college experience, and has less than one dependent.
6
As the summary statistics indicate, study participants were largely LMI/subprime borrowers. This nonstandard subject pool is of particular interest, as the less secure position of LMI and subprime households puts them at great nancial risk (see Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Sha r 2004) . There are also very few experimental studies focusing solely on the behavior of LMI families in developed countries (an exception is Catherine Eckel, Cathleen Johnson, and Claude Montmarquette 2005) . When interpreting the magnitudes of the presented results, the low income of participants should be taken into account. As in many experimental and survey studies, individuals select to come to the VITA sites and participate in our study. As we show in Meier and Sprenger (2008) , study participants are more nancially literate and more patient than individuals at the VITA site who elect not to participate. Though the direction of any potential bias is dif cult to assess, one should keep the selection of the sample in mind when generalizing the results of this study.
B. Credit Bureau Data
Information on individual credit behavior was obtained from one of three major credit bureaus in the United States. The credit reports list detailed information on each individual's credit behavior, like outstanding balances and available credit limits (for details on credit reporting, see Robert B. Avery et al. 2003) . Unlike selfreported data, credit reports give a very detailed, objective picture of individual borrowing behavior. 7 We measure credit card borrowing as outstanding balances on revolving accounts. Table 1 illustrates the two stylized facts of credit card borrowing previously noted: high borrowing and substantial debt heterogeneity. The average credit card 6 For a number of observations, we lack certain socio-demographic information (gender, race, and college experience). Each of these variables is binary. For the analysis below, we set missing values to the value of the majority and add indicator variables for missing gender, race and college experience in each regression. Excluding observations with missing variables does not affect the results (see Section IIB).
7 Credit reports do not include nontraditional loan products (e.g., payday loans). For a subset of our sample in 2006 (N = 131), we use self-reported information on loans obtained from pawn brokers, check cashers, payday lenders, friends, family, or on any outstanding balances on bills due to medical providers, landlords, and utilities providers. Nontraditional debt of this type is relatively small, averaging $372 (SD $827) per person. Adding nontraditional debt to aggregate debt does not in uence the results. As people often underreport their debt levels in surveys, we do not incorporate self-reported debt in our regression analysis.
8 Though balances listed on credit reports are point-in-time measures, we argue that our borrowing measures closely re ect revolving balances and not convenience charges. In general, only around 5-10 percent of total balances are convenience charges (Kathleen W. Johnson 2004) . Additionally, we implemented a companion survey with questions on credit card bill payment habits as worded in the Survey of Consumer Finances (N = 174). Individuals who report normally paying the full amount on their credit card at the end of the month (21 percent of the sample), have signi cantly lower balances on revolving accounts ($1,093 versus $3,086; p < 0.05 in a t-test).
balance is $1,059 (standard deviation (SD) $2,414), with 40 percent of participants carrying credit balances.
Credit reports provide crucial information on credit card holdership and revolving credit limits. In our sample, the average revolving credit limit is $4,764 (SD $11,850), with 53 percent of study participants having no credit cards. Credit reports do not provide information on credit card interest rates. However, we use Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) credit scores as a proxy for interest rates, as most nancial institutions use risk-based pricing strategies (see Mark Furletti 2003) . The average FICO score in our sample is 610 (median: 596), indicating that subjects likely face subprime interest rates given the common subprime cutoff of 620. Shane Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue 2002.) We analyze decisions from two multiple price lists in which individuals are asked to make a series of choices between a smaller reward ($X) in period t and a larger reward ($Y > $X) in period τ. We keep $Y constant and vary $X in two time frames. In time frame 1, t is the present (t = 0) and τ is in one month (τ =1); and in time frame 2, t is six months from the study date (t = 6) and τ is seven months from the study date (τ = 7).
9 The delay length, d, is one month in both time frames.
The design In order to provide an incentive for the truthful revelation of preferences, 10 percent of individuals were randomly paid one of their choices. This was done with a raf e ticket, given to subjects at the end of their tax ling, indicating which choice, if any, would be effective. To ensure the credibility of the payments, we immediately lled out money orders for the winning amounts, in the presence of the participants, then put the money orders in labeled, pre-stamped envelopes, and sealed the envelopes. The payment was guaranteed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, and individuals were informed that they could go to VITA site coordinators to report any problems receiving payment. Money orders were mailed to the winner's home address on the same day as the experiment (if t = 0), or in one, six, or seven months, depending on the winner's choice. All payments were mailed to equate the transaction costs of earlier and later payments. The payment procedure mimicked a frontend-delay design (Harrison et al. 2005) . The details of the payment procedure were the same in both years, and participants were fully informed about the payment method. 10 9 Individuals were also asked to make choices between the present (t = 0), and in six months (τ = 6), in a third time frame. As it may be cognitively more dif cult to give dynamically consistent answers in this choice environment, responses from the third time frame are added to the analysis only as a robustness test. Results are qualitatively unchanged (see Section IIB).
10 If individuals expect to move in the next seven months, they might question the likelihood that their mail would be forwarded to their new address in a timely manner. As movers might prefer payments in the present for logistical reasons, and not for reasons related to their underlying time preference, we asked individuals: "Do you expect to move in the next 7 months?" Whether individuals expect to move does not correlate with elicited time preferences and does not affect our results.
Using monetary rewards and multiple price lists as a preference elicitation mechanism allows us to identify differences in patience and present bias between individuals. This methodology yields measures that are highly correlated with time preference measures derived from other methodologies (e.g., Ernesto Reuben, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales 2008; Christopher F. Chabris et al. 2008) . Over time, time preference measures obtained from price lists have also been shown to be stable at the individual level (see Meier and Sprenger 2009) . It is important to note that this research requires a reliable measure of the heterogeneity in time preferences between individuals, but not necessarily precise point estimates of the levels of parameters. Therefore, relatively less space in the following sections is dedicated to discussing parameter levels, and relatively more attention is given to the correlation between preferences and borrowing behavior.
Time Preference Measures.-In the two different time frames, individuals make choices between a smaller reward at time t and a larger amount one month later. Using information from both price lists allows us to measure discount factors and to identify present and future bias.
Individual discount factor (IDF):
We estimate monthly IDFs by observing the point in a given price list, X * , at which individuals switch from opting for the smaller, earlier payment to opting for the larger, later payment. That is, a discount factor is taken from the last point at which an individual prefers the earlier, smaller payment, assuming that X * ≈ IDF 12 Making these calculations for the two multiple price lists yields two discount measures, IDF t ,τ : IDF 0,1 , IDF 6,7 . We use the average of these calculated monthly discount factors as the IDF in the main analysis.
Present bias and future bias: Using two time frames allows us to identify dynamic inconsistency. Dynamically inconsistent individuals exhibit a bias toward either present or future payments. An individual is present-biased if he is less patient (lower IDF) when the smaller, earlier payment is received in the present (t = 0). We classify an individual as present-biased if IDF 0,1 < IDF 6,7 , and 11 This formulation is equivalent to positing a linear utility function over the experimental outcomes and normalizing extra-experimental consumption (e.g., background consumption) to zero. This procedure simplies the analysis considerably and is consistent with expected utility theory, which implies that consumers are approximately risk neutral over small stakes outcomes (Rabin 2000) . However, parameters estimated from price lists may also capture differences across individuals in the degree utility function curvature (Steffen Andersen et al. 2008) . As a robustness test, we control for a survey measure of individual risk attitudes. Controlling for risk attitudes does not affect the results of this paper (see Section IB).
12 It should also be noted that the price list methodology does not elicit point estimates of the IDF but rather ranges of where the IDF lies. Our analysis accounts for this interval nature of the data when identifying present (future) bias and when exploring the relationship between IDF, credit constraints, and socio-demographics (see Table 2 ).
as future-biased if IDF 0,1 > IDF 6,7 . For our primary analysis, we use indicator variables Present Bias (=1) and Future Bias (=1) following these classi cations.
In robustness tests, we use several additional measures for present bias. First, we use the ratio IDF 6,7 /IDF 0,1 as a measure of the intensity of present (future) bias. Second, we calculate a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function (Robert H. Strotz 1956; Edmund S. Phelps and Robert A. Pollak 1968; Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999) , and use the resulting present-bias parameter, β. Third, we include additional information from a third time frame in which t = 0 and τ = 6, and construct composite measures of dynamic inconsistency (see Section IB).
In order to have useable measures of IDF and dynamic inconsistency, an individual must exhibit a unique switching point in each price list. In both years, about 11 percent of participants do not exhibit unique switching points. In the main analysis, we focus on a primary sample of the 541 individuals who do show unique switching points in all price lists. When we include individuals with multiple switching points in a robustness test, by using their rst switching point, the results are maintained (see Section IB).
For participants in the primary sample (column 2 of Table 1 ), we measure a monthly discount factor, IDF, of 0.83 as shown in panel C of Table 1 . This discount factor is low, but consistent with previous research, which tends to nd low discount factors in experimental studies (see Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue 2002) . Decisions on payday loans or used cars often imply much lower discount factors for subprime borrowers than measured by our experiment (e.g., 
D. Measurement Validation
The method described above for measuring time preferences with incentivized choice experiments has many advantages (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue 2002) , but also several challenges. Experimental responses are argued to be impacted by extra-experimental borrowing and lending opportunities (Coller and Williams 1999; Harrison, Lau, and Williams 2002; Harrison et al. 2005 ; Robin P. Cubitt and Daniel Read 2007) , and also potentially associated with credit and liquidity constraints, and credit experience. In the present study, these issues take on particular importance, as we not only experimentally measure time preferences, but also correlate them with actual borrowing behavior.
The impact of extra-experimental borrowing and lending opportunities can be seen as an arbitrage argument. If an individual can borrow at a lower interest rate than the experimentally offered rate, then the individual should wait for later experimental payments, borrow outside the experiment, and repay with experimental earnings, thereby arbitraging the experiment with a "borrow low-save high" strategy. If an individual can lend (save) at a higher rate than the experimentally offered rate, a second arbitrage strategy is open, and the individual should take the earlier experimental payment and invest it at the available higher rate.
We argue that prevailing interest rates for LMI individuals leave open only one of these strategies. The lowest annual interest rate offered in the experiment, in either year, is about 27 percent (calculated as (50/49 12 − 1), and the next lowest annual interest rate is about 110 percent. Study subjects are unlikely to have investment opportunites in excess of this rate. This feature of our experimental design largely eliminates the second arbitrage opportunity, primarily leaving open the strategy of borrowing low outside the experiment and saving high inside the experiment. Such a strategy would lead to a high degree of observed patience and dynamic inconsistency only when individuals' extra-experimental opportunities are time dependent. The data are not consistent with a large number of individuals employing such a strategy: a high degree of impatience is observed and a substantial number of subjects are dynamically inconsistent.
Related to the issue of outside "investment" opportunities is the potential impact of high interest debt on experimental responses. Individuals with high-interest debt (e.g., payday or auto title loans not reported to credit bureaus) may pay down their expensive debt with earlier experimental payments, appearing relatively impatient. If such individuals also expect (rightly or wrongly) to not have such high-interest debt in the future, they may appear present-biased. Such a strategy of paying down high interest debt with experimental earnings would be employed by individuals who are unable to borrow on better terms than the high experimentally offered rates. Credit constrained individuals are one critical group for whom this may be true. It is therefore important to test the impact of credit constraints on experimental responses.
The credit report data enable us to determine precisely how much an individual is able to borrow on revolving accounts. Therefore, we have an exact measure of credit constraints. Additionally, we are able to develop other measures of liquidity positions and credit experience from tax and credit report data. Individual tax data allows us to measure the size of federal tax refunds (or liability), and whether or not tax refunds are direct deposited. This provides a picture of future liquidity (or constraint) and the timing of that future liquidity. 13 Credit reports allow us to measure the number of loan accounts in an individual's credit history and whether or not an individual has suf cient credit history to be given a FICO score by the credit bureau. Table 2 presents regressions using measured time preferences as the dependent variables. Columns 1 and 2 present OLS models in which the dependent variable is the average discount factor measure (IDF). Columns 3 and 4 present interval regressions (Mark B. Stewart 1983) in which the dependent variable is the interval measure of an IDF t,τ . Columns 5 and 6 present OLS regressions in which Present Bias (=1) is the dependent variable. In each speci cation, we control for basic demographic characteristics of age, gender, and race. Columns 2, 4, and 6 additionally control for credit constraints (measured as the amount of available credit), for future liquidity ( measured as future tax refund quantity and whether or not it will be direct deposited), and for credit experience proxies (measured as whether credit history is suf cient to receive a FICO credit score and the number of credit history loan accounts). In columns 2, 4, and 6, we also control for potentially endogenous demographics: income, number of dependents, and education. In the interval regression, whether or not the price list involves the present, Has Present (=1), is also controlled for, and standard errors are clustered on the individual level. credit access, liquidity, and experience are unlikely to be drivers of experimental responses, and cannot explain the observed heterogeneity of present bias or its correlation with borrowing behavior.
14 Table 2 also presents results relevant for the general discussion of time preferences and socio-demographic characteristics (see Harrison, Lau, and Williams 2002) . Age is found to be negatively correlated with discount factors and whether or not individuals exhibit present bias. Men, though they have signi cantly lower discount factors than women, are equally likely to be present-biased. Individuals with higher income have higher measured discount factors, but are no more likely to be present-biased than others, while individuals of higher education have somewhat higher measured discount factors and are signi cantly more likely to be presentbiased. The observed correlation between education and present bias seems counterintuitive and requires attention in future research. Interestingly, the results of the interval regressions in columns 2 and 3 support the claim that individuals, on average, discount nonexponentially. Measured discount factors decrease when the present is involved, a pattern consistent with present-biased preferences (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue 2002) .
II. Results
The relationship between individual present bias and credit card borrowing is explored by estimating models of the following form:
(1)
Borrowing i is individual i's balance on revolving credit accounts on the study date.
For the 2006 sample, we also examine balances on revolving accounts one year after the choice experiments. As Borrowing is censored at zero, we estimate tobit regressions. All results hold when estimating OLS regressions (see the Web Appendix). IDF i , PresentBias i , and FutureBias i are measures of individual i's time preferences. Y i is a dummy for the year of study. The vector X i re ects individual control variables, which include age, gender, race, education, income, and number of dependents claimed for tax purposes. In certain speci cations, we control for credit card holdership, available credit limits, and FICO scores. Though presented in regression, we acknowledge that our evidence does not establish a causal link between present-biased preferences and borrowing behavior. Evidence in this paper should be interpreted as correlation between measured preferences and outstanding credit card balances. Table 3 presents results from tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is total outstanding credit card balances. Column 1 presents results without control variables. To this basic speci cation, in column 2, we add exogenous control variables: age, gender, and race. Column 3 adds further socio-demographics which may be correlated with time preferences: income, number of dependents, and college experience. Across speci cations, present-biased individuals are found to have substantially higher credit card balances. Controlling for demographics, the estimated relationship between present bias and card borrowing is economically important, given participants' low incomes, and statistically signi cant at the 99 percent level. Similar to Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) , the results show that IDFs are not signi cantly correlated with credit card debt levels.
A. Present Bias and Credit Card Borrowing
15
Marginal effects computed from the tobit model, in column 3, indicate that present-biased individuals are more likely to borrow, and borrow more than dynamically 15 The effect of the IDF is also modest in magnitude, as a change in a standard deviation of the IDF changes the probability of having any debt by only 2.5 percentage points. In this study, time preferences and credit card debt are point-in-time measures. Recent shocks could potentially in uence both card borrowing and measured preferences. A negative shock could increase credit card debt, and, if individuals were sufciently liquidity constrained, could also impact measured preferences (see Meier and Sprenger (2009) 17 Column 4 presents this follow-up analysis. Tobit models are estimated with the dependent variable of credit card borrowing observed one year after the original time preference experiment. The results indicate that present bias remains substantially and signi cantly correlated with card borrowing even one year after time preferences are measured. Present-biased individuals are, again, found to be more likely to borrow, and borrow more than dynamically consistent individuals. This follow-up analysis suggests that recent short-lived shocks are not driving the correlation between present bias and credit card debt.
Credit access and credit limits play an interesting role in the discussion of present bias and borrowing.
18 Not only may individuals choose their credit limits and number of credit cards, but rms may grant high or low credit limits, or deny credit entirely. Column 5 controls for the results of these interactions by adding, as explanatory variables, whether or not individuals have a credit card and their remaining available credit limit across all accounts (in natural logarithm). Controlling for these credit constraints, present bias is, again, associated with more credit card borrowing. Present-biased individuals are roughly 20 percentage points more likely to borrow, and, conditional on borrowing, have around $430 more debt than dynamically consistent individuals.
19
In general, the demand for credit card borrowing is responsive to interest rate changes (Gross and Souleles 2002) . Controlling for the price of credit in our analysis is a key concern. Credit reports do not provide direct interest rate information. However, individual credit scores can be used as an interest rate proxy given the prevalence of risk-based pricing in credit markets (Furletti 2003) . Column 6 in Table  3 accounts for possible differences in interest rates across subjects by controlling for 16 The results hold when analyzing only individuals with positive amounts of debt, and when using the natural logarithm of the outstanding balance (see the Web Appendix). 18 Borrowers aware of their present bias may want to restrict their borrowing opportunities, and may choose a lower credit limit or not to have a credit card at all. For a discussion of "sophisticated" borrowing, see Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) .
19 Results from analysis of a payment behavior question similar to the Survey of Consumer Finances indicate that present-biased individuals are also less likely to self-report that they normally pay their credit card in full at the end of the month. Results may be obtained from the authors on request.
FICO scores. 20 Controlling for FICO scores as a proxy for interest rates, present bias is associated with both a higher probability of borrowing and conditionally more debt.
In sum, the results indicate that individuals who exhibit present bias are between 15 and 20 percentage points more likely to borrow on their credit cards. Conditional upon borrowing, present-biased individuals have around $400-$580 (about 25 percent) more debt than dynamically consistent individuals. The relationship between present bias and credit card debt is maintained when controlling for demographics, credit constraints (both credit access and limits), and a proxy for interest rates. One year after the original time preference experiment, present bias remains signi cantly correlated with card borrowing.
B. Robustness Tests
This section tests the robustness of the obtained results: rst, to changes in calculating time preferences; and second, to controlling for risk attitudes and relaxing the sample restriction criteria.
Columns 1-3 in Table 4 present results with alternative speci cations of present bias. In column 1, we calculate the ratio IDF 6,7 /IDF 0,1 . This ratio takes on the value one for dynamically consistent individuals, is above one for present-biased individuals, and is below one for future-biased individuals. This measure captures the direction and the intensity of dynamic inconsistency. We nd that more present-biased individuals have higher debt levels. In column 2, we t experimental choices with a quasi-hyperbolic discounting, β, δ, model. 21 The results indicate that present-biased individuals, i.e., those with lower β, have signi cantly higher revolving balances. In column 3, we add the information from a third timeframe in which t = 0 and τ = 6. This third time frame gives an additional indication of individual dynamic inconsistency. The composite measure
_________
PresentBias takes on the value of one if IDF 0,1 < IDF 6,7 and IDF 0,1 < IDF 0, 6 . 22 The results are robust to adding the choices from this third timeframe to the analysis.
Columns 4-6 in Table 4 show the robustness of the results to including individual risk attitudes and to changes in sample restrictions. Individual risk attitudes are taken from a survey question on general risk attitudes previously validated in a large, representative sample (Dohmen et al. 2005) . 23 Column 4 indicates that the results are maintained with the inclusion of this measure, providing suggestive evidence that individual risk preferences do not impact the association between card borrowing and present bias. Column 5 includes individuals who exhibit multiple switching points and make it dif cult to calculate a discount factor. For these individuals, we take their rst switching point to calculate their IDFs. The results are unchanged. 20 Individuals with insuf cient credit history to be scored are bottom-coded as 0. We also include an indicator variable for whether or not an individual is scored. 21 The calculations are δ = IDF 6,7 ; β = IDF 0,1 /IDF 6,7 . 22 The composite measure
________
FutureBias is similarly generated and is given the value one when IDF 0,1 > IDF 6,7 and IDF 0,1 > IDF 0, 6 . 23 Participants answer the following question: "How willing are you to take risks in general? (on a scale from "unwilling" to "fully prepared") on a scale from 0 to 7 in 2006 and from 0 to 10 in 2007. We rescale the answer to be on an 11-point scale in both years.
We nd that present-biased individuals are more likely to borrow and, conditionally, borrow more than dynamically consistent individuals. The relationship between present bias and credit card debt is maintained when controlling for demographics, credit constraints (both access and limits), and a proxy for interest rates. One year after the original time preference experiment, present bias remains signi cantly correlated with card borrowing. The results are unaffected by changes in the calculation of present bias or sample selection criteria.
The nding that directly measured present bias correlates with credit card borrowing gives critical support to behavioral economics models of present-biased preferences in consumer choice. This paper opens up a number of avenues for future research. First, the results presented here are correlative. Future research should focus on the more dif cult problem of exploring the theoretically proposed causal link between present bias and borrowing. Second, our efforts focus exclusively on credit card borrowing and not other forms of debt (e.g., installment loans, mortgages, etc.). Credit card debt is identi ed as being psychologically different from other forms of debt (e.g., Drazen Prelec and Duncan Simester 2001), and, so, future work should determine whether or not our results extend to other borrowing behavior. Third, our analysis shows nothing with regard to the discussion of sophistication and naïvete in present bias. A number of policy implications with regard to card borrowing depend critically on borrower sophistication (see, for example, Colin Camerer et al. 2003) . Research should investigate which present-biased consumers are and are not cognizant of their own present bias.
